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Testing life-cycle models and other economic models of saving and consumption at micro level
requires knowledge of individuals’ subjective believes of their mortality risk. Previous studies have
shown that individual responses on subjective survival probabilities are generally consistent with
life tables. However, survey responses suffer serious problems caused by focal responses of zero and
one. This paper suggests using a Bayesian update model that accounts for the problems encountered
in focal responses. We also propose models that help us to identify how much each individual
deviates from life table in her subjective belief.  The resulting individual subjective survival curves
have considerable variations and are readily applicable in testing economic models that require
individual subjective life expectancies.
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Many economic models are based on the forward-looking behavior of economic 
agents. Although it is often said that “expectations” about future events are important in 
these models, it is the probability distributions of future events that influence the models. 
For example, an individual’s consumption and saving decisions are believed to depend 
upon concerns regarding future interest rates, the likelihood of dying, and the risk of 
substantial future medical expenditures. According to our theories, decision makers have 
subjective probability distributions about these and other events in their lives, and 
moreover, use them to make decisions about their saving practices. 
A typical objective of empirical models on intertemporal decision making is to 
estimate responses to changes in variable levels, such as changes in saving due to an 
anticipated change in the interest rate. A second objective is to find the extent of an 
individual’s risk aversion; namely, what is his or her response to changes in outcome 
variability? For instance, do changes in the variability of future income lead to changes in 
saving practices? These are worthwhile objectives due to the importance of society of 
choices that depend on uncertain future events. For example, poverty in old age depends 
partly on an individual’s consumption choices at a younger age. Consequently, how is 
consumption influenced by mortality risk and the uncertainty of medical expenditures? 
Why do some individuals purchase adequate insurance against unfavorable outcomes 
while others do not? Why do many reach retirement age with inadequate financial 
provisions for post-retirement living expenses? Is it due to misperceptions about the 
probabilities of reaching old age? Do people maintain excessive housing into old age as a   4
hedge against inflation risk? The answers to these and similar questions depend on our 
understandings of decision maker reactions to future uncertainty. Moreover, creating 
policies that alleviate the consequences of such decision-making processes depends on 
answers to the aforementioned questions. 
In a few economic models, we have data on probability distributions that are 
assumed to approximate those required by decision making models under uncertainty. 
Life cycle models of consumption, in which mortality risk helps determine savings, have 
been estimated by assuming that individuals have subjective probability distributions on 
mortality risk that are the same as those found from life tables (Hurd 1989). A 
precautionary motive for saving thus depends on the risk of future medical outlays. It 
therefore seems reasonable that the distribution of outlays as estimated from micro data 
represents a good approximation of the subjective probability distributions used by 
decision makers (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995). More generally, Manski (1993) 
has proposed using observed outcome probabilities in panel data as estimations of the 
subjective probability distributions for individuals on the panel on the grounds that the 
sampling exercise can itself be taken as a “model” of the subjective probability process.  
In most applications, however, we do not have adequate data for probability 
distributions thus requiring the use of unverifiable assumptions in estimations. For 
example, in macroeconomic models expectations are assumed to be rational, which often 
yields an estimated relationship. Yet, the rationality assumption cannot be tested outside 
of the model’s immediate context. In life cycle models on saving, a cohort’s average 
mortality risk may not be well approximated by the mortality risk found on life tables due 
to changes in risk; that is, a cohort may not believe that the mortality experience of older   5
cohorts will be the same as his or her own. Furthermore, individuals within the same 
cohort will have different subjective evaluations of probability distributions and its 
influence on their behavior, even if it is systematically incorrect. However, such 
evaluations are not generally observable. These individual heterogeneities often become 
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where ct is the consumption at time t, and γ is the risk aversion parameter. The first order 
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where ht is the individual subjective hazard rates, while X represents certain socio-
demographic variables. In this framework, if ht is not observed but correlated with Xt, we 
will have a typical endogeneity problem. If ht is poorly measured, estimations of γ will 
subsequently be biased. 
Previous studies have typically obtained individual mortality risks through two 
different approaches: either by using life tables or by using well-known variations in 
mortality rates by economic status. Since mortality risk life tables only vary by age, race, 
and sex, there are not enough variations from which to calculate mortality risks. If 
subjective mortality risks of individuals with different economic status vary in the same 
way as observed mortality rates, model estimations using standard life tables will lead to 
biased estimates. Moreover, forecasts of economic status distributions will be incorrect 
such that poorer individuals who believe that their mortality risk is higher will spend   6
money faster than what is predicted by the model. Yet, according to observable 
characteristics, mortality risk variations can, in principle, be calculated given that some 
economic variables are potentially endogenous. More importantly, individuals surely 
have subjective probability distributions that are partly related to observable variables. 
Two recent surveys have posed questions regarding individual subjective 
probabilities including, Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) and 
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Hurd and McGarry (1995) reveal that average 
survival probabilities are very close to those presented in life tables. In a more recent 
paper, Hurd and McGarry (2002) use panel data from HRS and find that respondents 
modify their probabilities in response to new information such as the onset of a new 
illness. Their findings are consistent with an earlier study of Hamermesh (1985) who 
surveys a selected sample of economists about their survival probabilities. Although on 
average self-reported survival probabilities are consistent with life tables, at the personal 
level, however, these probabilities face a serious problem. In all age groups, we find that 
a large fraction of respondents give what we call focal-point responses: 0.0 and 1.0. 
These responses cannot represent the respondents’ true probabilities as the distribution of 
true probabilities should be continuous, and moreover, true probabilities cannot literally 
equal zero or one. Thus the main focus of this paper is to “recover” the “true” subjective 
survival curve for each respondent. To do so, we develop a Bayesian update model to 
accomplish this objective. 
In our model, for individuals at age a, we let the prior survival probability 
distribution at a future point in time (a+t) be a truncated normal between zero and one 
(we do not include zero and one). The conditional density of the observed survival   7
probability is assumed to be a censored normal between zero and one, allowing for the 
focal points. In addition, we suggest two approaches that model the deviations of each 
individual’s belief from the life table.  
We use the posterior density mean as an individual’s estimated subjective survival 
probabilities, and estimate the model using the observed death record. Our model 
produces optimistic indices to measure the deviation of her subjective belief from the life 
table. Consequently, the survival curves for each individual produced by the optimistic 
indices do not encounter problems associated with focal points and have considerable 
variations. These subjective survival curves are readily applicable to life cycle models 
and other economic models that require individual subjective mortality risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the self-
reported subjective survival probabilities including their consistency with the life table 
and problems associated with individual responses. Next, Section 3 introduces a Bayesian 
method that helps us to recover underlying subjective survival curves. Section 3 also 
introduces two approaches that are used to represent individual deviations from life 
tables. In Section 4, we estimate the model and conduct the out-of-sample prediction. 
Lastly, we present the paper’s conclusions in Section 5. 
II. Individual Subjective Mortality Risk 
In the AHEAD sample, each respondent is asked a series of questions about how 
likely various presented future events will occur.  These future events include: an income 
that is consistent with changes in inflation, major medical expenses, leaving a bequest, 
receiving financial help from family members, moving to a nursing home,  and surviving   8
for another 10-14 years.
2 In particular, the survival probability question AHEAD posed to 
respondents is as follows:  
[Using any] number from 0 to 100 where “0” means that  you think there 
is absolutely no chance and “100” means that you think the event is 
absolutely sure to happen … What do you think are chances that: You will 
live to at least A?(A is an age that is 11-15 years older than the 
respondent’s current age) 
 
To examine whether these survival probabilities carry useful information, we 
compare the subjective survival probabilities with the life tables. Table 1 lists the  
average and median survival probabilities from AHEAD and the 1992 life tables for the 
target ages used in the AHEAD survival questions as calculated by the first two waves of 
AHEAD (e.g., 85 years of age for subjects aged 70-74, 90 years of age for subjects aged 
75-79, etc.). In general, younger AHEAD respondents have average subjective 
probabilities that closely mirror life table averages, while older respondents have 
averages that are substantially higher.
3 In general, AHEAD medians are closely related to 
those in the life table.  
Table 2 lists the percentage of those respondents who gave continuous responses, 
focal responses, and no responses in the two waves. Table 2 also lists the transition 
probabilities of different response modes between the two waves. In wave 1, only 41.5% 
of respondents gave continuous responses, with more than 30% of them providing either 
                                                 
2 Bassett and Lumsdaine (2001) find that all responses contain a common component. 
3 Several reasons are suggested in Hurd, McFadden and Gan (1997) for this finding. One reason is that the 
AHEAD survey does not include respondents who reside in nursing homes or other institutional care 
facilities. Thus AHEAD represents a healthier population than is represented by a life table.    9
zero or one as their answers. The subjective probabilities for the remainder of the 
population are not available. In wave 2, more than 75% of respondents gave continuous 
responses, where approximately 19% of the population either responded zero or one. 
Thus the prevalence of focal-point responses indicate that subjective probability 
measurements in AHEAD cannot represent the respondents’ true probabilities. Without 
correcting for focal responses of zero or one, it is impossible to derive a survival curve 
that varies over time. Thus the primary objective of this paper is to “recover” the “true” 
subjective survival curve for each respondent, especially for those who give focal 
responses of zero or one. In the next section, we develop a Bayesian update model to 
achieve this objective. 
III. Modeling Individual Subjective Survival Curves 
Before we present the model, it is necessary to define the notations that we use 
throughout this paper. 
•  a: age. 
•  t: time at risk. 
•  Lo(t): life table survival probability from birth. 
•  Soa(t) = Lo(a+t)/ Lo(a): life table survival probability from age a. 
•  Λ0(t): life table integrated mortality hazard rate. 
•  λ0(t): life table mortality hazard rate. 
•  T: an age at which Lo(T) = 0, say T = 108. 
•  i: individual.   10
•  Sia(t): personal survival probability from age a to target age a + t for subject i. 
Since survival probabilities differ for different people at the same age a, we let 
Sia(t) be a random variable with a density π(sia(t)), or π(siat). 
•  Λia(t): personal integrated mortality hazard rate at age a. 
•  λ ia(t): personal mortality hazard rate at age a. 
•  τ: time at risk in interview survival question. 
•  piaτ: response to interview survival question. We assume that piaτ is measured with 
an error. The density of piaτ conditional on personal survival probability from age 
a to age a+ t is given by: () τ τ τ ia ia ia s S p f = .   
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It is first necessary to specify the plausible families of λia(a+t) that satisfy this 
equation. We propose to use the population hazard function λoa(a+t) as a base, while 
minimally modifying it to calculate individual λia(a+t).  Two alternative ways to specify 
the λia(a+t) function include: 
). ( ) ( 0 t a t a a i ia + = + λ γ λ                         (2) 
The parameter γi is an individual “optimism” parameter. In comparison with the 
life table, if γi >1, then the person is “pessimistic”; however, if γi < 1, then the person is 
“optimistic”. Since this model in (2) scales the population hazard, we will refer to it as a 
“hazard-scaling” model from now on. 
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This model represents an accelerated failure time frame where the individual 
thinks of herself as aging forward from her current age more or less rapidly than the 
average person. If a large γi corresponds to slow future aging, i.e, γi>1, then the person is 
“optimistic;” however, if γia < 1, then the person is “pessimistic”.  Similarly, we refer to 
the model in (3) as the “age-scaling” model as it scales ages to represent individual 
optimism. 
If there is no response error or focal bias in piaτ, the models in (2) and (3) are 
accurately identified has having no free parameters. We can then take these models as 
actual survival information, and subsequently, decide which model works best. If a 
response error or focal bias in piaτ  is present, then the personal survival curve is not 
forced through piaτ at age a + τ. In this case, we use a Bayesian framework instead. Our 
basic assumptions are addressed below. Prior belief for the personal survival curve 
density iat S is ) ( iat s π . The mean for prior density is () at 0 exp ∆Λ − ψ  where ψ  represents a 
parameter for measuring the population’s average subjective optimistic degree (when 
1 = ψ , the mean of prior distribution  iat S  corresponds with the life table value). 
Given iat S , the self-reported survival probability iat p has a density of  () iat iat s p f . The 
difference between the self-reported survival probability iat p and the subjective survival 
probability  iat S  is the measurement error.    12
The primary objective of this paper is to use the observed  τ ia p to update the prior 
density ) ( τ π ia s and to obtain the posterior density  ). | ( τ τ π ia ia p s  After we observe τ ia p , the 
posterior density of  iat S  is given by: 
                        () ()
() () ∫
=
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If the loss function is given by: () ( )
2 ˆ ˆ , it it it it S S E S S L − = , the best estimator for τ i S  
is  () τ τ τ ia i i p S E S = ˆ . We apply  τ i S ˆ  to the observed death record to obtain the model’s 
parameter values. The log-likelihood function is given by: 
( ) ∑ ∑ − + =
dead alive
ˆ 1 ln ˆ ln ln it it S S L .                  (4) 
  We can obtain estimates of parameters of the prior and posterior densities by 
maximizing the log-likelihood function in (4).  
IV. Estimation and Out-of-Sample Prediction 
Maximizing the likelihood function in (4) requires specifying the distribution 
functions. The probability of an agent whose current age is a and who survives until age 
a + t is given by iat s . Different agents will have different survival probabilities. For the 
population of agents who share the same age a, their surviving probabilities are a random 
variable Siat. Let the prior distribution for the random variable Siat, ) ( τ π ia s  be the 
truncated normal distribution. We also let the mean of Siat be () at 0 exp ∆Λ − ψ , variance 
2
2 σ , 
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where  ia v and  2 σ satisfy the equation:  
() ( ) 2 2 0 , , 1 , 0 exp σ ν η σ ν ψ iat iat at − = ∆Λ − .                                      (6) 
The right hand side of (6) represents the mean of the truncated normal in (5) with 
its formula provided in the Appendix. We let the conditional density of the responses to 












































ia ia s p .  
Furthermore, we assume that the expected value of the conditional distribution 
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The formula for the mean of the censored normal is given in the Appendix. The 
censored normal captures the idea that many observations may be at zero or one. 






























ia ia ia ia ia
ia ia ia ia ia
ia ia
ds
v s s p



























τ .                (7)   14
The distribution in (7) is no longer a normal or a censored normal. The best 
estimator for ia S  under a mean square loss function is its mean: 
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π τ . 
Then, the best predictor for ia S  when 0 = iat p  is: 
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.                   (10) 
In (8), (9) and (10), we obtain the predicted  ia S ˆ  given the observed subjective 
survival probability of τ ia p . 
Since respondents are interviewed every two years, we update information 
regarding whether they are still alive accordingly. The likelihood function in (4) should 




2 ˆ 1 ln ˆ ln ln ia ia S S L .  However, the self-reported survival 
probability is not merely the survival probability during a two-year period. Rather, it 
typically represents a survival probability 10-15 years in the future.  
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Therefore,  
2 ˆ





0 2 0 ˆ ∆Λ ∆Λ ,                                                         (12) 
After substituting the above expression of  i γ ˆ , the log-likelihood function can be 
written as:   16
( ) ∑ ∑
∆Λ ∆Λ ∆Λ ∆Λ − + =
dead alive
0 2 0 0 2 0 ˆ 1 ln ˆ ln ln
τ τ
τ τ
a a a a
ia ia S S L . 
Although we cannot arrive at the explicit expression of  i γ  through the age-scaling 
model, we can numerically solve the following equation to obtain the estimated value of 
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In sum, we let the prior survival probability distribution from age a to age a+t be 
a truncated normal (between 0.0 and 1.0).  Moreover, the conditional density of observed 
survival probabilities is assumed to be a censored normal, when wallowing for the focal 
points 0.0 and 1.0, while the posterior density of the survival probabilities will have a 
distribution that does not allow for the focal points 0.0 and 1.0. In order to obtain the 
model’s parameter values, we apply the posterior distribution mean to actual death 
records between wave 1 and wave 2 in order to estimate a person’s survival probability. 
Both the hazard-scaling model in (2) and the age-scaling model in (3) are 
estimated. In each model, we first let ψ =1, constraining the mean of the prior density to 
be the same as that of the life table. Whenever we do this, we refer to the model as the 
constrained model. In addition, we let ψ be a parameter to be estimated. In this case, we 
let the data determine if the prior density mean is the same as the life table survival 
probability. We refer to such a model as an unconstrained model. Table 3 lists the results 
of four different specifications: constrained hazard-scaling model, unconstrained hazard-  17
scaling model, constrained age-scaling model, and finally, unconstrained age-scaling 
model. All four specifications yield reasonable estimates that are highly significant. 
Moreover, likelihood ratio tests favor unconstrained models over constrained models. 
Since we use a survey that has three-waves of data, we can apply the estimated 
parameters to actual survival experiences from wave 3 observations and compare the log-
likelihood of each model in order to select the best one.  We select the sample that are 
comprised of individuals who are still alive in wave 2, then calculate the log-likelihood 
values separated by those who are alive in wave 3 and those who are dead between waves 
2 and 3. The log-likelihood from the out-of-sample prediction is given by: 
( ) ∑ ∑ − + =
3   &   2   b/w wave   dead
4
3    wave in   alive
4 ˆ 1 ln ˆ ln ln ia ia S S L  
The log-likelihood values from the out-of-sample predictions are reported in 
Table 3. The two unconstrained models perform much better than the corresponding two 
constrained models. Between the two unconstrained models, the hazard-scaling model 
yields slightly better likelihood values than the unconstrained age-scaling model. 
For each specification, we calculate the optimistic indices γi for each individual. 
The formula to calculate γi in the hazard-scaling model is given by Equation (11) while 
the formula to calculate γi in the age-scaling model is provided in Equation (13).  Table 4 
presents the summary statistics of the indices and the correlation coefficients from the 
four different models’ indices.  
From Table 4, we find that the correlation coefficients among different indices are 
very high. The lowest correlation coefficient between the unconstrained hazard-scaling 
model and the age-scaling model is -.8975. The negative signs for the correlation 
coefficients between the two models are expected; that is, in the hazard-scaling model,   18
the larger the index, the less optimistic a person is. The inverse result can be found for the 
age-scaling model; namely, the larger the index, the more optimistic a person is. The 
highest correlation coefficient between the unconstrained and the constrained hazard 
scaling models is .9887, which is very close to 1.  
Although the correlations among the four different specifications are very high, 
the means of estimated i γ  from the four different models differ significantly. These 
means are also reported in Table 4. The estimated  i γ ˆ  for unconstrained specifications 
portrays a more optimistic picture than those for constrained specifications. In the hazard-
scaling model, the average i γ ˆ  in the constrained specification is 1.020, indicating that an 
individual’s subjective survival probability on average is very close to the life table. In 
the unconstrained version of the hazard model, the average  i γ ˆ  is .822, indicating that 
people are generally optimistic about their survival probabilities. Similar patterns occur in 
the two specifications of the age-scaling model. 
In the constrained specification, the means of the prior densities (truncated 
normal) are constrained according to life-table survival probabilities. The Bayesian 
update model only changes its σ2, i.e., the standard deviation of the original normal 
density that generates the truncated normal density (See (5) and (6)). Although updating 
σ2 may have some effects on the means of the prior densities, the effect is minimal. 
Therefore it is not surprising to see that the constrained versions of both models are very 
similar to life tables.  In the unconstrained specification, and in addition to obtaining the 
value of σ2, the updated Bayesian model also changes the mean of the prior densities 
through ψ.     19
Although different specifications yield different levels of optimistic indices, an 
important feature of all these indices is that a significant heterogeneity exists among all 
individuals.  The individual heterogeneity in γi can be summarized by a simple regression 
that uses the optimism indices to regress certain demographic variables. In this 
regression, four different optimism indices represent dependent variables, while 
independent variables include a constant, the person’s age, a male dummy, an African-
American dummy, the Hispanic dummy, and lastly, a marriage status dummy. We report 
the estimation results in Table 5.  
From the estimates reported in Table 5, the coefficients for African American 
dummies are negative for the hazard scaling model specifications and positive for the 
age-scaling model specifications. All coefficients indicate that African Americans are 
more optimistic than White respondents. No difference exists between Hispanic and 
White respondents in terms of their optimism indices. Another pattern that can be found 
in all four specifications is the finding that male respondents are more optimistic than 
female respondents. In addition, older respondents are generally more optimistic than 
younger respondents in three specifications. The only exception is the unconstrained age-
scaling model where the age coefficient is insignificant. Finally, whether a person is 
married does not make any difference in his/her optimism indices.  
Tables 6 through 9 provide the predicted survival probabilities of four different 
specifications, the stated survival probabilities, and the life table survival probabilities. 
The predicted survival probabilities in the unconstrained specifications are higher than 
those based on constrained specifications. This derives from the fact that the   20
unconstrained specifications produce indices that indicate more optimism than those 
based on unconstrained specifications. 
In Figure 1, we produce two fitted probability histograms for males and females 
between the ages of 70-74 at the time the survey is conducted for the constrained hazard-
scaling model. The histograms for all other age groups and all other models are the same 
save for their location. From this figure, all focal responses of zero and one have moved 
away from zero and one. For example, for males who are between 70 – 74 years old at 
the time of the survey, the predicted probabilities of surviving to age 85 are .22 and .61 if 
the responses are zero and one, respectively. Figure 2 has various survival curves for both 
males and females at age 70 for both constrained and unconstrained specifications in the 
hazard-scaling model. Graphs based on other models at other age categories look similar. 
In Figure 2, the lines personal-p=1 and personal-p=0 represent the survival curves if the 
response is one and zero, respectively. The line personal-p=Average represents the 
survival curve if the response represents the average of all responses. Not surprising, a 
person whose response is one typically has the highest survival curve, thus demonstrating 
the highest survival probabilities, while a person whose response is 0.0 has the lowest 
survival curve.  
The densities of prior and posterior densities are illustrated in Figure 3. The first 
panel in Figure 3 shows the prior and posterior densities if the response is one, with the 
posterior density lying to the right of the prior density. Similarly, in the second panel in 
Figure 3, the posterior density lies to the left of the prior density if the response is zero. 
This is what one would expect from the Bayesian update model. The third panel in Figure 
3 illustrates a case where the response is 0.5. Finally, we produce histograms of the   21
estimated optimistic parameters γi for all four models in Figure 4. The average and 
standard deviations of γi are also given in the histograms.  There are significant variations 
between these indices. The significant variations in optimistic indices produce significant 
variations in individual survival curves. 
IV. Conclusions 
Many economic models are based on forward-looking behavior on the part of 
economic agents. Surveys such as HRS and AHEAD ask individuals for their 
expectations on the probability of given future events occurring in their lifetime. On 
average, the subjective probability of a future event is consistent with the observed 
probability that the event does occur. In other words, individual survival probabilities are 
consistent with those from the life tables.  
However, at the micro level, the subjective probability responses in HRS and 
AHEAD suffer serious problems with focal responses of 0.0 and 1.0. Consequently, 
applying subjective probabilities are extremely limited if “true” subjective survival 
probabilities are not recovered.  
In this paper, we suggest a Bayesian update model that is based on actual survival 
information to account for problems caused by focal responses of 0.0 and 1.0. As a result, 
individual survival curves derived from the model do not suffer the problems of focal 
responses. We also propose two approaches to model the individual heterogeneities of 
their subjective survival curves. One approach modifies the life table hazard rates while 
another approach models the subjective aging process that is different from the life table 
aging process. The model is estimated from the observed survival information of our 
sample. From the estimated model, we construct several optimistic indices for each   22
individual and conduct a test that is based on out-of-sample prediction. These optimistic 
are used to create individual subjective survival curves that have considerable variations 
and are readily applicable to economic models that require individual subjective survival 
curves. In a companion paper, we apply these individual subjective survival curves to a 
life-cycle model of savings and bequests. 
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Mean of the Censored Normal Distribution.  
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Table 1 Self-Reported and Life Table Survival Probabilities 
 
   Target Age 
   Male     female 
   80  85  90  95  100    80  85  90  95  100 
               Wave 1             
Means                                 
AHEAD  0.557  0.510 0.382 0.332 0.302    0.570 0.510 0.386 0.307 0.289
Life  Table 0.593  0.422 0.252 0.114 0.037    0.716 0.605 0.432 0.232 0.081
Median                
AHEAD  0.500  0.500 0.400 0.250 0.100    0.500 0.500 0.450 0.100 0.100
Life  Table 0.593  0.422 0.252 0.115 0.037    0.723 0.603 0.433 0.232 0.076
# of obs  90  951  631  436  175    575  1334  978  664  309 
           Wave 2        
Means                 
AHEAD  0.524  0.279 0.622 0.278 0.574    0.516 0.283 0.692 0.296 0.559
Life  Table 0.614  0.457 0.284 0.138 0.078    0.736 0.633 0.464 0.260 0.138
Median                
AHEAD  0.500  0.200 0.600 0.200 0.600    0.500 0.200 0.600 0.200 0.600
Life  Table 0.629  0.456 0.285 0.140 0.051    0.746 0.632 0.465 0.261 0.100
# of obs  95  1044 675  451  223    620  1436  1090  807  498 
 
 
Table 2 Focal Responses 
 
      Wave 2    
   continuous 0  1  NA  Total 
Wave 1  continuous  2,700  328  221  153  3,413 
   79.3%  9.6%  6.5%  4.6%  41.5% 
 0  1,599  201  177  104  2,041 
   76.4%  9.9%  8.7%  5.1%  24.8% 
 1  452  60  64  29  605 
   74.7%  9.9%  10.6%  4.8%  7.4% 
 NA  1,467  169  350  173  2,159 
    68.0%  7.8%  16.2% 8.0% 26.3% 
 Total  6,189  758  812  459  8,218 
   75.3%  9.2%  9.9%  5.6%   
   26
 
Table 3:  Estimation Results 
 
 Hazard-scaling    Age-scaling 
Parameter  ψ=1  ψ is a    ψ=1  ψ is a 
   parameter     parameter 
Std dev of conditional density:  1 σ   .3255 .1837    .5434 .2793 
    (censored normal)  (.1197)
a) (.0154)  (.0012)  (.0312) 
Std dev of prior density:  2 σ   .2045 .1165    .3159  0.1083 
    (truncated normal)  (.0045)  (.0176)    (.0000011)  (.0304) 
Average optimistic parameter: ψ    .7226      0.6590 
   (.0507)      (.0011) 
Maximum Likelihood Value:  -1495  -1483    -1500  -1491 
Log likelihood for out-of-sample  
      Prediction 
-1692.9 -1532.4   -1644.1 -1533.4 






Table 4: Correlation Coefficients among Four Optimistic Indices 
 
 Hazard-scaling  Hazard-scaling  Age-scaling  Age-scaling 
 (constrained)
a)   (unconstrained)  (constrained)  (unconstrained)  
Hazard-scaling   1  .9887  -.9000  -.9019 
    (constrained)    (.00024)
b) (.0014)  (.0018) 
Hazard-scaling     1  -.8975  -.9284 
 (unconstrained)      (.0017)  (.0016) 
Age-scaling       1  .9479 
    (constrained)        (.0015) 
Age-scaling       1 
  (unconstrained)         
Means 1.040  .822  1.051  1.271 
   (std error)  (.375)  (.296)  (.227)  (.186) 
a) “constrained” means ψ =1; “unconstrained” means ψ is a parameter to be estimated. 
b) Standard errors are in parenthesis, calculated from bootstrapping 1,000 times of the 
    sample. 




Table 5: Summary Regressions of Four Optimistic Indices 
 
 Hazard-scaling  Hazard-scaling  Age-scaling  Age-scaling 
  (constrained)   (unconstrained)   (constrained)  (unconstrained) 
Constant 1.120  1.546  .740  1.201 
 (.38)
a) (.050) (.039) (.189) 
Age  -.011 -.0089 .0036 -.0036 
 (.00081)  (.00064)  (.00050)  (.0051) 
Male -.176  -.132  .0982  .0914 
 (.010)  (.0079)  (.0059)  (.00475) 
Black -.065  -.052  .0625  .0446 
 (.022)  (.012)  (.0091)  (.0074) 
Hispanic .065  .0043  .0021  -.00467 
  (.022) (.017) (.014) (.011) 
Married  .0066 .0072 -.0095 .0034 
  (.0104) (.0082) (.0063) (.0052) 
No. of obs.  6089  6089  6089  6089 
R
2  .0948 .0909 .0638 .0859 
a) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 




Table 6: Fitted Survival Probabilities  
(Constrained hazard-scaling model) 
 
         Nonfocal  Focal  Focal   All    
    Respondents  Respondents  Respondents  Respondents   
Age Target  Life      piaτ = 0  piaτ = 1    
Group Age Table Predicted  Stated Predicted  Predicted  Predicted  Stated 
Female 
  
                   
  
 
     70-74  85  0.5880  0.5565  0.5001  0.3571  0.7592  0.5604  0.5095 
     (0.0696)
a)  (0.0218)  (0.0213)  (0.1215)  
     75-79  90  0.4250  0.4426  0.4616  0.2486  0.6584  0.4107  0.3885 
     (0.0745)   (0.0155) (0.0348) (0.1319)   
     80-84  95  0.2240  0.2904  0.4139  0.1398  0.4806  0.2485   0.3029 
     (0.0666)   (0.0176) (0.0213) (0.1113)   
                 
Male               
     70-74  85  0.3970  0.4293  0.4845  0.2270  0.6342  0.4383  0.5103 
     (0.0680)   (0.0225) (0.0250) (0.1199)   
     75-79  90  0.2500  0.3086  0.4127  0.1466  0.5091  0.2936  0.3820 
     (0.0651)   (0.0133) (0.0446) (0.1079)   
     80-84  95  0.1130  0.1848  0.3960  0.0771  0.3208  0.1645  0.3324 
     (0.0543)   (0.0119) (0.0561) (0.0845)   
a) Standard errors are in parenthesis.    29
 
 
Table 7: Fitted Survival Probabilities 
(Unconstrained hazard-scaling model) 
 
         Nonfocal  Focal  Focal  All Respondents 
         Respondents  Respondents  Respondents       
Age Target  Life      piaτ = 0  piaτ = 1    
Group Age Table Predicted  Stated Predicted  Predicted Predicted  Stated 
Female                         
     70-74  85  0.5880  0.6266  0.5001 0.4659  0.8062  0.6322  0.5095 
     (0.0708)
a)   (0.0193) (0.0207)  (0.1084)   
     75-79  90  0.4250  0.5171  0.4616 0.3602  0.7069  0.4927  0.3885 
     (0.0769)   (0.0169) (0.0323)  (0.1162)  
     80-84  95  0.2240  0.3634  0.4139 0.2117  0.5551  0.3213  0.3029 
     (0.0790)   (0.0242) (0.0158)  (0.1167)  
              
Male              
     70-74  85  0.3970  0.5042  0.4845 0.3339  0.6838  0.5129  0.5103 
     (0.0710)   (0.0304) (0.0227)  (0.1092)  
     75-79  90  0.2500  0.3814  0.4127 0.2224  0.5777  0.3667  0.3820 
     (0.0750)   (0.0199) (0.0377)  (0.1109)  
     80-84  95  0.1130  0.2673  0.3960 0.1191  0.4503  0.2390  0.3324 
     (0.0771)   (0.0171) (0.0380)  (0.1146)  
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Table 8: Fitted Survival Probabilities 
(Constrained age-scaling model) 
 
         Nonfocal  Focal  Focal  All Respondents 
         Respondents  Respondents  Respondents       
Age Target  Life      piaτ = 0  piaτ =1    
Group Age Table Predicted  Stated Predicted  Predicted Predicted  Stated 
Female                         
     70-74  85  0.5880  0.5561  0.5001  0.5589  0.7554  0.5589  0.5095 
     (0.0565)   (0.1167) (0.0195)  (0.1167)  
     75-79  90  0.4250  0.4452  0.4616  0.2516  0.6629  0.4136  0.3885 
     (0.0611)   (0.0141) (0.0342)  (0.1276)  
     80-84  95  0.2240  0.2917  0.4139  0.1505  0.4750  0.2529  0.3029 
     (0.0524)   (0.0165) (0.0249)  (0.1024)  
                
Male              
     70-74  85  0.3970  0.4306  0.4845  0.2320  0.6399  0.4407  0.5103 
     (0.0552)   (0.0209) (0.0250)  (0.1154)  
     75-79  90  0.2500  0.3112  0.4127  0.1572  0.5070  0.2974  0.3820 
     (0.0524)   (0.0132) (0.0476)  (0.0998)  
     80-84  95  0.1130  0.1788  0.3960  0.0850  0.2879  0.1602  0.3324 
     (0.0431)   (0.0123) (0.0646)  (0.0717)  
a) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 9: Fitted Survival Probabilities  
(Unconstrained age-scaling model) 
 
         Nonfocal  Focal  Focal  All Respondents 
         Respondents  Respondents  Respondents       
Age Target  Life      piaτ = 0  piaτ = 1    
Group  Age  Table  Predicted Stated Predicted  Predicted  Predicted Stated 
Female                        
     70-74  85  0.5880  0.6689  0.5001  0.5850  0.7728  0.6733  0.5095 
     (0.0384)   (0.0202) (0.0241)  (0.0606)  
     75-79  90  0.4250  0.5531  0.4616  0.4720  0.6592  0.5413  0.3885 
     (0.0446)   (0.0184) (0.0369)  (0.0649)  
     80-84  95  0.2240  0.3825  0.4139  0.3007  0.4864  0.3598  0.3029 
     (0.0457)   (0.0286) (0.0179)  (0.0662)  
                
M a l e               
     70-74  85  0.3970  0.5342  0.4845  0.4427  0.6329  0.5392  0.5103 
     (0.0394)   (0.0351) (0.0258)  (0.0613)  
     75-79  90  0.2500  0.4043  0.4127  0.2812  0.5122  0.3956  0.3820 
     (0.0458)   (0.0684) (0.0429)  (0.0657)  
     80-84  95  0.1130  0.2715  0.3960  0.1738  0.3719  0.2509  0.3324 
     (0.0488)   (0.0239) (0.0417)  (0.0728)  
a) Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
 
   32
 
Figure 1: Histograms of predicted survival probabilities 
 




Predicted Survival Probabilities to age 85 among 70-74 year females: Constrained Hazard-Scaling 
Model 
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Figure 2: Survival curves 
 
Survival Curves-Males aged 70: Unconstrained Hazard-Scaling Model 
 
Survival Curves-Females aged 70: Unconstrained Hazard-Scaling Model 
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Survival Curves-Females aged 70: Constrained Hazard-Scaling Model 
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Figure 4: Histogram for optimistic indices 
Histogram for optimistic index: unconstrained hazard-scaling model 
mean = 0.8229, standard deviation = 0.2956 
 
 
Histogram for optimistic index: constrained hazard-scaling model 
mean = 1.0398, standard deviation = 0.3752 
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Histogram for optimistic index: unconstrained age-scaling model 
mean = 1.2708, standard error = 0.1855 
 
Histogram for optimistic index: constrained age-scaling model 
mean = 1.0617, standard deviation = .2049 
 
 